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Not All Consumers Follow Suit: Information Choices and 
Effect of Reviews 
 
Seung Lee  





Understanding the process of consumers' buying decisions is not intuitively obvious 
from the way it appears. Before we come up with any acceptable account of the 
process, we should learn more about consumers' traits as well as the characteristics 
of the goods or services they intend to purchase. The goal of this study is to establish 
the alignment of consumers' buying decisions with information choice and 
determine why consumers may or may not make buying decisions compatible with 
reviewer comments. To explain the reality of multiple consumer equilibria, the 
paper draws on the four information choice theories: inattentiveness, rational 
inattention, information markets, and costly precision. Based on the theories, this 
paper considers why consumers may arrive at different buying decisions through 
their choice and processing of signals from consumer product reviews though the 
reviews are identical and considering that, in general, higher product ratings are 
associated with higher sales. Overall, this paper contributes to a better 
understanding of why consumers arrive at different buying decisions from the same 
pool of online consumer product reviews. 
 






As consumers get into a process of purchasing a product or service, they go through 
several stages, one of which is identification and observation of the product 
information sources (Engel et al. 1968). Consumers browse the internal and 
external environment to identify information sources and choose an information set 
to observe (Bunn 1993). Therefore, the final purchase decision can be influenced 
heavily by the observed, positive or negative information, especially from other 
customers, and by the level of motivation to refuse or accept the information (Kotler 
et al. 2009; Nielsen 2016; Wang and Cole 2016). For example, Wang and Cole 
(2016) found that the consumer's age, level of expertise, and information type 
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contained in product descriptions have different effects on consumers' evaluation 
of products. In other words, the final purchase decision can be influenced greatly 
by consumers' choice of information and the way they see the signals from the 
chosen information.  
 
In buying decision processes in today’s culture, consumers almost totally rely on 
online reviews. A recent study found that online consumer reviews aside from 
personal recommendations play a major role in purchase decisions (Paul and 
Hogan, 2015). As consumers search for product information for their purchase 
decisions, they often have access to a whole slew of online product reviews from 
other consumers. Those online consumer reviews are readily available along with 
other consumer-empowering product information, including third-party reviews, 
email newsletters, and personal recommendations generated by recommender 
systems. The effect of third-party reviews (Akdeniz et al. 2014; Chen and Xie 2005) 
and the role of email newsletters (Hartemo et al. 2016) have been studied 
extensively). Many studies have also been conducted on the role of online 
recommender systems (Baum and Spann 2014; Zhijie 2014) and the positive 
influence reputational and institutional mechanisms can have on consumer trust (Ba 
and Pavlou 2002; Fang et al. 2014; Gefen and Pavlou 2008). In addition, many 
studies have examined the effects of online customer reviews on purchase decisions 
from numerous different perspectives, such as the characteristics of reviewers 
(Forman et al. 2008; Salehan and Kim 2016; Smith et al. 2005) and the temporal 
effect of reviews (Li and Hitt 2008). Previous studies have also found that online 
consumer reviews, in both the macro and micro levels, can have a positive impact 
on sales (Chen et al. 2008; Chen and Xi 2008; Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; 
Clemons et al. 2006; Mudambi and Schuff 2010). Particularly, Chen et al. (2008) 
found that, at a disaggregate level, consumers' evaluations of individual reviews are 
affected by both the reviewer quality in an online community and the helpfulness 
of the review to the community measured by the content quality. As past research 
found, online customer reviews influence consumer purchase decisions and higher 
product ratings are associated with higher sales. One area in need of further study, 
though, is why not all consumers follow suit. In other words, why do consumers 
get different signals from the same reviews and end up with different purchase 
decisions? For example, many online consumer reviews read like "This book is a 
masterpiece. I feel fortunate that I discovered it before most other people. I 
discovered it by reading an extremely negative review for this book [emphasis 
added] …" (Gary 2015), "'Suicide Squad' Opens at Number One Film as Fans 
Ignore Critics [emphasis added]" (Sakoui 2016), and many others (see Streitfeld 
2016). Furthermore, consumers are more likely to buy a product based on the 
quantity of reviews, rather than the quality of what the reviews say (Powell et al. 
2017). These seemingly erratic behaviors of consumers call for a study on the 
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relationships between online consumer reviews and consumers' final purchase 
decisions from a different vantage point. 
 
Between the reviews posted on retail websites (e.g., www.amazon.com), social 
media (e.g., www.reddit.com), expert reviews (e.g., www.cnet.com), and crowd-
sourced review sites (e.g., www.angieslist.com), people are awash in product or 
service information, most of it accessible at negligible cost. However, humans have 
only a finite capacity to process all of it. While the average consumer has access to 
a large amount of online reviews when he/she is in a buying decision process 
(Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006), not all the reviews can receive equal attention. How 
carefully does a consumer read online reviews from other consumers before making 
a final purchase decision? How many reviews does a consumer read from the 
strangers? In other words, depending on the types of information choices and the 
amount of information consumers choose to observe, different consumers can 
arrive at different purchase decisions even if those decisions are not the best ones 
in light of the reviews. The incongruent purchase decisions may be affected by 
either idiosyncratic signal noises or common signal noises or both. Idiosyncratic 
signal noises or independent signal realization (Myatt and Wallace 2012) fall into 
consumers' cognitive domain or characteristics. They include consumers' 
perception on the review authenticity (Kugler 2014), consumers' previous 
knowledge or experiences with the products or services contradictory to the reviews 
(Park and Kim 2008), increased awareness even with negative reviews (Berger et 
al. 2016), positive views as good products or services regardless of their reputations 
(Monks 2015; Thaler 1980), perceived information diagnosticity of a review (Jiang 
and Benbasat 2004 2007; Kempf  and Smith 1998; Pavlou and Fygenson 2006; 
Pavlou et al. 2007), and social learning (Powell et al. 2017). On the other hand, 
common signal noises or common signal realization (Myatt and Wallace 2012) are 
related to product characteristics, such as the product type (experience vs search), 
product popularity, product category (hedonic vs utilitarian), hype around the 
product, and inaccurate information about the product (Black 1986; Mudambi and 
Schuff 2010; Zhu and Zhang 2010). 
 
This implies that consumers do not always choose to buy products with the most 
favorable online consumer reviews. Products that do not receive stellar reviews may 
still be purchased by consumers depending on the consumers' types of information 
choices, the signals they choose to observe, and signal noises. From a different point 
of view, products with relatively higher positive online consumer reviews may not 
entirely crowd out the competing products that have relatively lower reviews. As 
digital technologies accelerate, consumers have access to overwhelming amounts 
of information as never before—from other proprietary and public sources, not just 
from online consumer reviews. This is profoundly changing the strategic landscape: 
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altering the structure where business competes, redefining the way in which 
business operates, and, ultimately, transforming performance across industries (Hirt 
and Willmott 2014). Indeed, providing and responding to online consumer reviews, 
either online or blended, have become an important strategic component of many 
businesses (Chevalier et al. 2016). Given the strategic importance of consumer 
reviews and those being an important resource for consumers making purchase 
decisions, we draw on information choice theory and on past research to explain 
why different types of information choices can bring multiple different purchase 
decisions on different consumers. Overall, this paper contributes to a better 
understanding of why consumers arrive at different buying decisions after reading 
the same pool of online consumer product reviews. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews 
literature related to information choice and processing. We then present a 
theoretical framework as common ground for applying the four information choice 
theories to consumer buying decision process. In the next section, each information 
choice theory elaborates why consumers can arrive at different buying decisions 
based on the same product reviews. In the last section, we conclude the article with 
implications of the four different information choice theories on the effect of 





In neoclassical economics, consumer behavior is explained by utility maximization. 
The objective of the consumer is to choose a product that maximizes his/her utility 
under the given constraints, including tastes, budget, and prices. Meanwhile, the 
economics of information proposes that consumers often must make purchase 
decisions with partial information when they do not have complete information on 
product quality, seller credibility, and the available substitutes. This lack of 
information introduces uncertainty in a buying decision process, therefore, 
consumers seek additional information to reduce their uncertainty. However, 
seeking information incurs both internal and external search costs (Smith et al. 
1999). The major external costs are the monetary costs of obtaining the information 
and the opportunity cost of the time spent on searching. Internal costs include 
sorting and choosing the incoming signals and integrating them with the consumer's 
prior knowledge. Search costs are not the same for all consumers; they are often 
determined by the consumer's socioeconomic background and level of performance 
in the search (Smith et al. 1999; Stigler 1961).  
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The key objective of the consumer's buying decision process is to make a decision 
close to the true state (optimal decision that carries a maximum utility) and close to 
the average action of other consumers or, at least partially, to increase decision 
accuracy by reducing uncertainty (Myatt and Wallace 2012; Hellwig et al 2012). 
For reduced uncertainty, consumers can search for more information while 
acknowledging that an additional search may not even out added benefits with extra 
costs (Stigler 1961). Consumers can use decision and comparison aids (Wang and 
Benbasat 2009) and numerical content ratings, such as the star rating (Poston and 
Speier 2005), to reduce search costs and improve the buying decision process. 
Consumers can also utilize various types of information choices to determine the 
information sets and signals to observe, and they can process the signals with or 
without the influence of signal noises to take an action (Myatt and Wallace 2012; 
Reis 2006; Sims 2003; Veldkamp 2006). That is, their types of information choices 
and the context of information processing under uncertainty can increase decision 
accuracy or bring multiple decision results—either all consumers, no consumers, 
or some consumers follow other consumers' decisions as manifested in their online 
reviews. 
 
Information, Signal, and Signal Noise 
 
In information economics, information is a key player in economic decisions (Allen 
1990; Arrow 1996; de Langhe et al. 2016; Hellwig and Veldkamp 2009). 
Information is often hard to trust; it may be functional or dysfunctional due to 
different cognitive processes or signal noises; it can be endogenous or exogenous; 
or it can be considered a commodity because its acquisition can be costly. It is 
possible for consumers in a purchase decision process to have a certain degree of 
information or knowledge about the product under consideration. Nevertheless, 
they desire information because it helps them reduce the uncertainty of taking 
action by complementing or substituting their prior knowledge (or, more generally, 
by reducing information asymmetry). Uncertainty is a state that arises when a 
consumer is engaged in a decision making process based on less than perfect 
information or knowledge (Downey and Slocum 1975). In the communications 
perspectives, information is a signal; an observed random variable that is not 
independent of unobserved variables that affect economic decisions (Arrow 1996). 
Put differently, signals are observable characteristics attached to a piece of 
information or information set that can be manipulated by its source (Spence 1973). 
The signals consumers observe depends both on the availability of an observable 
pool of information known as an information set and on the consumers’ choice of 
what to learn. Consumers who want to replicate other consumers’ behavior want 
the knowledge that their predecessor has. The opposite is also true. Consumers who 
choose to act when other consumers choose not to act want more information 
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regarding not acting.(Hellwig and Veldkamp 2009). This involves searching for 
information from various sources. Each information source provides informative 
signals with some source-specific noise, and a consumer observes the signals with 
some additional noise of his or her own (Myatt and Wallace 2012). 
 
Black (1986) defined noise as something that is the opposite of information. 
Consumers as economic agents sometimes make decisions on information in the 
usual way. They seem to maximize expected returns or obtain maximum utilities, 
at least close to the true state. On the other hand, agents sometimes commit 
transactions on noise as if it were information. These transactions end up incorrect 
or suboptimal decisions. In a different perspective, Black defined noise as what 
makes agents' observations imperfect. It keeps consumers from knowing the 
expected return on their purchases. In general, noise keeps consumers from 
knowing what, if anything, they can do to achieve better decision outcomes. He 
also viewed noise as the arbitrary element in expectations and unknown 
information. As another point of view, the noise from an information source (sender 
noise), which is error contained in the source, determines the underlying accuracy 
of the signals, and the noise from a signal observer (receiver noise), which is error 
either in observing signals or in acquiring or absorbing signals, determines the 
signal clarity. The sender noise is a common or external noise, and the receiver 
noise is an idiosyncratic or internal noise (Myatt and Wallace 2012; Wu and Newell 
2003). This suggests that making a buying decision depends heavily on 
conceptualizations—consumers' internal, mental models of themselves and of the 
things with which they are interacting—they bring to the task (Friestad and Wright 
1994; Noman 1983). 
 
Knowledge and Mental Model 
 
As past studies on online consumers have found, purchase decisions are greatly 
influenced by the review system and the consumer's mental model of the review 
system. The review system consists of the available online consumer reviews on 
the product under consideration, the characteristics of the information contained in 
the reviews, and an appropriate representation of the system in the sense of linking 
the buyer and seller that is accurate, consistent, and complete. Mental models 
naturally evolve through interaction with a review system (Norman 1983). These 
models are not technically accurate as they are continually modified to get to a 
workable result and constrained by such things as consumers' decision-making 
styles, prior product knowledge, and the limitations of individual's information 
processing capacity (Friestad and Wright 1994; Norman 1983; Miller 1956). 
Specifically, Norman (1983) found that the mental models people bring to perform 
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a task are not precise and sophisticated. They are fractional and contain areas of 
uncertainties, inconsistencies, imprecision, and idiosyncratic oddities.  
 
Besides, people often feel uncertain of their own knowledge—even when it is, in 
fact, complete and correct—and their mental models include accounts of the degree 
of certainty they feel for different aspects of their knowledge. Thus, a person's 
mental model includes knowledge or beliefs that are considered to be of doubtful 
validity. Some of this leads to seemingly correct decisions, even if they make no 
sense. People's doubts and various degrees of certainty about their knowledge 
control their behavior and make them exercise extra caution when making decisions 
under the available information set, with the chosen signals out of the available 
information set, and with the limited capacity for information processing within a 
background of noise (Norman and Bobrow 1975). This is especially likely to be the 
case when a person is knowledgeable about the category of the product under 
consideration and has extended experience with review systems (Wang and Cole 
2016; Zhu and Zhang 2010). Therefore, from past research on online consumers 
and mental models, we can state that an online buying decision process is heavily 
influenced by the consumer's information choice. It is in turn dependent on 
information costs (e.g., search and acquisition costs), review system (e.g., signal 
and signal noise embedded in online consumer reviews), product characteristics 
(e.g., product type, such as search, experience, hedonic and utilitarian goods), and 
consumer characteristics (e.g., mental model formed upon previous experience and 
prior knowledge). 
 
Information Choice Theories 
 
Economic activities, such as purchasing, involve making decisions. To make better 
decisions, economic agents, including consumers, need information. Thus, the 
problem of choice, acquisition, and observation of information has become a key 
issue in information economics. Past research in information economics has 
identified four major types of information choices: inattentiveness (Reis 2006), 
rational inattention (Sims 2003), information markets (Veldkamp 2006), and costly 
precision (Myatt and Wallace 2012).  
 
As past economics literature has extensively examined (see Smith et al. 1999), it is 
costly for a rational consumer to acquire and process information to make an 
optimal purchase decision that maximizes his/her utility subject to such standard 
constraints as budget, prices, and preferences. Obtaining information, processing 
and interpreting it, and deciding optimal action are all costly in money and time. 
Moreover, the entire process may be annoying or frustrating for some consumers. 
Consequently, a consumer does not pay attention to all the information. This type 
Not All Consumers Follow Suit: Information Choices and Effect of Reviews                             S. Lee 
©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2017  98       ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy 
of information choice is called the inattentiveness (Reis 2006). The consumer 
simply acts as if he/she was living under perfect certainty. There are a couple of 
properties of inattentiveness (Reis 2006). The smaller the costs of acquisition, 
processing, and interpretation of information plus the costs of planning an optimal 
action, the more a consumer will be inattentive to information. In addition, the 
lower is the risk faced by the consumer and the lower her aversion to this risk, the 
more he/she will be inattentive to information. This implies that if the overall costs 
of information and planning are not too small, inattentiveness is optimal behavior 
(Reis 2006). Meanwhile, another stream of research on information choice puts 
more weight on the finite capacity of consumers in processing information, not just 
costs. 
 
Given a physical constraint on the rate at which people can process information, 
which is known as the Shannon’s channel capacity (Cover and Thomas 2006), 
consumers decide what signals to observe from the chosen information sources. 
They also decide how much attention to devote to different signals so that they can 
make purchase decisions close to the true state in the Bayesian sense and close to 
the average action of other consumers (Myatt and Wallace 2012). Rational 
inattention theory incorporates such limits in individual's information processing 
capacity (Sims 2003). It does not assume a symmetry of reactions to positive or 
negative information. The theory focuses on how consumers allocate attention, one 
of the scarce resources, when they make economic decisions. That is, consumers as 
decision makers have a limited amount of attention so that they have to decide how 
to allocate it. For example, there is a large amount of information on the product 
available to consumers, but due to limited attention, it is simply impossible for the 
consumers to attend to all that information. Therefore, consumers must choose 
which information to attend to more carefully, which information to attend to less 
carefully, and which information to ignore (Sims 2003). With the view of the rate 
of information flow as the rate of uncertainty reduction, Sims (2003) modelled 
attention as an information flow and limited attention as a bound on information 
flow. The more attention a consumer allocates to information, the less uncertainty 
he/she gets. Thus, limited attention simply imposes a limit on the signal-to-noise 
ratio in the signal on the subject of a purchase decision. Yet, another branch of study 
on information theory, dubbed information markets by Veldkamp (2006), focuses 
on the non-rival nature of information and access to multiple information markets. 
 
In economics, rivalry is used to describe a characteristic of a good, including a 
physical good or a nonphysical good such as information. A good can be 
characterized on a continuum between rival to non-rival. A good is considered non-
rival if, for any level of production, the marginal cost of production is zero or nearly 
zero. Non-rivalry does not mean that the total production costs are low. It is just 
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concerned about the marginal cost of production (Cornes and Sandler 1986). The 
non-rival nature of information, coupled with free entry in the information market, 
can reduce the uncertainty over a decision—making process, and the riskier the 
perceived consequence of a decision, the more valuable the public information 
becomes because it can be used both to predict the true state and to predict others' 
actions (Veldkamp 2006). Thus, the marginal value of public information exceeds 
the marginal value of private knowledge. When a decision entails a low risk, the 
degree of the complementarity or substitutability of the information diminishes, or 
the information can be completely ignored (Veldkamp 2006). Depending on the 
amount of consumers' knowledge (idiosyncratic noise) or, put differently, 
depending on the degree of complementarity of information about the product 
under purchase consideration, observation of the information may or may not 
increase the dispersion of the consumers' decisions. Highly dispersed decisions 
imply that consumers do not follow suit. For example, when consumers have a 
lower degree of knowledge about products, risk-averse consumers may purchase 
only the products with the highest ratings and numbers because the consumers 
prefer products that they are informed about. This is more likely in a multiple 
information markets setting where access to the markets is free and marginal cost 
of producing information is very low or even zero (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; 
Romer 1990; Veldkamp 2006). 
 
The fourth information choice theory, called the costly precision is proposed by 
Myatt and Wallace (2012) and centers around the underlying accuracy of an 
informative signal (how precisely it identifies the true state) and clarity of the 
informative signal (how easy it is to understand). According to Myatt and Wallace 
(2012), when there is a collection of information sources accessible to economic 
agents such as consumers, the informative signal from each source comes with 
some source-specific noise named sender noise. It determines the signal's 
underlying accuracy. A consumer then observes this signal with some additional 
consumer-specific noise named receiver noise, which determines the signal's 
clarity. Receiver noise is reduced if a consumer listens to the signal with great care, 
which of course incurs a greater cost. Sender noise is originated from an 
information source, while receiver noise comes from error either in observation or 
in understanding of a signal. Then, to which information sources do consumers 
listen, and how carefully do consumers choose to listen to each informative signal? 
The answers are determined by the degree of precision of accuracy and clarity, as 
well as the cost of information against its benefit (Wyatt and Wallace 2012). The 
costly precision theory concludes that the clearest signals receive attention, even if 
they have poor underlying accuracy and that the number of signals consumers 
observe decreases as the complementarity of other consumers' actions rises. This is 
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because decision-makers look for actions that are not only matched to some 





The above reviews on the concepts and the information choice theories imply that 
consumers who must make buying decisions under uncertainty and wish to 
maximize their utilities would consider the actions of other consumers. Then the 
purchasing consumers make purchase decisions close to the true state based on 
some inference from their mental models of other consumers' actions and 
knowledge of the product under consideration. Intuitively, as in the Keynesian 
beauty contest (Keynes 1936), the consumers choose what information to observe 
about the true state before they make purchase decisions. Different types of 
information choices by the consumers result in different cost functions for the 
information choice set and different constraints on the signal choice set. 
Specifically, under the unknown true state s, which is drawn from a prior 
distribution of the random variable s and a series of signals about s, consumers 
indexed by a continuum of measure one observe their chosen signals and 
simultaneously take an optimal action or make a decision. In other words, 
consumers choose an action ai to minimize the expected squared distance between 
the weighted average ?̅? of the individual consumer's action and the unknown true 
state s, minus any cost c of acquiring information, where c is expressed in units of 
expected utility: 
 
(1) u(ai, ?̅?, s) = − (ai − r?̅? − (1 − r)s)2 − c. 
 
The coefficient r (which is always less than 1) measures the complementarity and/or 
substitutability of consumers' decisions. A positive, higher r means more 
complementarity. If the coefficient r is greater than 0, decisions are 
complementary—that is, best decisions are increasing in the actions of other 
consumers. If r < 0, decisions are strategic substitutes. If s is a common, well-known 
state (i.e., if there is no or virtually no alternative choice), the best action of ith 
consumer is ai = (1 - r)s + r?̅?, and ai = ?̅? = s constitutes the unique decision. 
Let Ki represent the information set including the chosen signals s. The first-order 
condition of (1) with regard to ai turns out ai = E[r?̅? + (1 – r)s | Ki]. The utility 
function (1) is then simply a conditional variance u(ai, ?̅?, s) = Var(r?̅? + (1 – r)s | 
Ki) – c. The conditional variance can be decomposed into the variances of individual 
terms of the expression r?̅? + (1 – r)s and a covariance term, which constitutes the 
expected utility of ith consumer: 
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(2) E[u(ai, ?̅?, s)] = – (r2Var[?̅? | Ki] + 2r(1 – r)Cov[?̅?, s | Ki] + (1 – r)2Var[s | Ki]) – c. 
 
Because (2) is the expected utility of a consumer who acts optimally after observing 
his chosen signals S, it is the payoff function for his/her information choice. This 
means that to figure out the value of any information choices, it is sufficient to know 
what the information implies for the three moments: (1) the conditional variance of 
the state (i.e., the variance of the true state given the information set); (2) the 
conditional variance of the average action (i.e., the variance of the average action 
given the information set); and (3) the covariance between the average action and 
the true state.  
 
Taking Noises into Account 
 
As Black (1986) defined, noise is something opposite of information. Consumers 
can be exposed to either common noise or idiosyncratic noise or both. Suppose 
there is a k-dimensional vector of common signal noises p, distributed with mean 
= 0 and a variance, independent of the true state s. Besides, for each consumer, there 
is a l-dimensional vector of idiosyncratic signal noises qi, distributed with mean = 
0 and a variance, independent of the true state s and p. This introduction of noises 
at the individual consumer level gives an n-dimensional vector of potentially 
observable signals to each consumer, denoted by zi, including the two types of 
noise. 
 
(3)  zi = 1n.s + Dp + Bqi, 
 
where 1n is an n x 1 vector of ones and D and B are n by k and n by l matrices of 
coefficients with rank n, respectively. Therefore, the consumer i's jth signal can be 
represented as 𝑧𝑗
𝑖 = s + dj pj + bj 𝑞𝑗
𝑖 . This composition of individual consumer's 
signals allows for arbitrary correlation in signals across consumers. Specifically, by 
setting either the row vector d or the row vector b equal to zero, we can define a 
spectrum of signals between two extremes: pure private signals and pure public or 
common signals. As dj + bj approaches infinity, signal j gets unobserved or 
uninformative because noise becomes a dominant component of the consumer i's 
jth signal. Consequently, the consumer's cost of information is determined by a 
function c(d, b), where the cost decreases as d and/or b gets larger. 
 
Updating Priors Beliefs to Posterior Beliefs 
 
Individual consumer i's signals are an unbiased predictor of the true state s with 
variance bj2 + dj2. Following the Bayes’ Law, consumers' posterior beliefs E[s | Ki], 
Var[s | Ki], and E[?̅? | Ki] are reversely related to the variance bj2 + dj2 and the 
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parameters of the true state s distribution N(µ, 𝜏𝑠
−1), where 𝜏𝑠
−1
 (the reciprocal of 
the variance) represents the precision of the true state s (i.e., the width of the 
distribution of s), and Ki denotes the information set including the chosen signals s. 
In particular, the update of the average action ?̅? by consumers depends on the 
characteristics of the signal they observe. In case of symmetric information choices, 
where all consumers choose to observe signals with the same precision and, 
therefore, choose the same action rules, signal outcomes and realized actions may 
differ. This can be shown as ai = ϒ0 µ + ∑  𝑗 ϒj 𝑧𝑗
𝑖, where ϒ0 denotes the weight on 
priors in actions, ϒ denotes the weight on the signal if only one signal is observed, 
and ϒj denotes the weight on signal j ≥ 1 when multiple signals are observed. Since 
qi (idiosyncratic noise of the i's consumer) is independent across consumers, ?̅? = ϒ0 
µ + ∑  𝑗 ϒj (s + dj pj). Thus, the posterior beliefs about average actions are 
summarized by 
 
(4) E[?̅? | Ki] = ϒ0 µ + ∑  𝑗 ϒj (E[s | Ki] + djE[pj | Ki]) 
 
 
INFORMATION CHOICES AND BUYING DECISIONS 
 
A consumer's learning about the true state s and the consequent actions can be 
explained by many different information choice theories, each of which is a case of 
(3) with varying restriction on d and b. In this section, we discuss the implications 
of the restriction for the three statistics (i.e., Var[s | s], Var[?̅? | 𝑠], and Cov[?̅?, s | s]) 
and the information choice equilibria. In Bayesian statistical inference, a prior is a 
probability distribution of an uncertain quantity that would express one's beliefs 
about the quantity before some evidence is considered. 
 
Inattentiveness and Buying Decisions 
 
Let us assume two extreme cases where a consumer can choose one of two options: 
observe no signal (d + b = ∞) or observe s exactly (d = b = 0) at a cost c. The first 
option means that all signals are either purely private or common. The second 
option indicates that the signals are not observed or unattended. In both case, the 
precision tends to infinity. Reis (2006) called this information choice the 
inattentiveness, where consumers choose their own information update paths at 
some intervals and hence adjust their actions infrequently. 
 
Since, in this case, informed consumers know the true state s and other consumers’ 
information sets, they can deduce average actions. Thus, Var[s | s] = Var[?̅? | 𝑠] = 
Cov[?̅?, s | s] = 0. Let β be the subset of consumers who choose to update 
information. According to the first order condition, uninformed consumers should 
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choose ai = μ, and informed consumers should choose ai = (1 − ϒ) μ + ϒs, where 
ϒ = (1 − r)/(1 − rβ) and r measures either substitutability (r < 0) or complementarity 
(r > 0). The statistics for uninformed consumers are Var[s] = τs−1, Var[?̅?] = ϒ 2 τs−1 
and Cov[?̅?, s] = ϒ τs−1. Thus, the inattentiveness theory can bring about three types 
of possible equilibria: either all consumers, no consumers, or some consumers 
acquire full information by update. The prevailing equilibrium depends on the 
information cost c, the degree of complementarity r, and prior precision τs.  
 
Proposition 1: With fixed costs of information update and complementarity in 
consumer actions (r > 0), either all consumers, no consumers, or some consumers 
act in line with the given product reviews if c ∈ ((1 − r)2τs−1, τs−1). When r > 0, a 
consumer's buying decision is based on the reviews. When r < 0, a buying decision 
becomes a strategic one unconcerned about the reviews. 
 
Rational Inattention and Buying Decisions 
 
Some reviews such as bought reviews or puff pieces tend to be biased and 
correlated. However, in many cases, individual reviews (signals) about the true state 
s are uncorrelated across consumers (D = 0). Suppose the consumer observes a 
single signal. Then, zi = s + bi qi where qi ∼ N(0, 1) are independent across i. Each 
consumer chooses bi to maximize expected utility (2), subject to a cost function 
c(bi) that is decreasing in bi (the coefficient of the idiosyncratic signal noise). Sims 
(2003) described this kind of information choice using rational inattention theory, 
where a consumer can access all information. Nevertheless, consumers' limited 
information-processing ability causes them to introduce noise to whatever they 
observe. Each consumer creates his/her own noise, independent of any other 
consumer. Having d = 0 means that, as consumer i observes more information, 
Var[s | Ki], Var[?̅? | Ki], and Cov[?̅?, s | Ki] fall together by the same proportion, where 
and Ki denotes the information set including the chosen signals s by a consumer.  
 
If consumers acquire more information, they put more weight on the more precise 
private signals (idiosyncratic noises) when forming their actions. Thus, (1 − ϒ0) 
increases because as consumers acquire more information, the weight on their 
priors in actions decreases. When actions are complements (r > 0), consumer i 
acquires more information to decrease Var[s | Ki]. This is a complementarity in 
information acquisition. However, this complementarity does not seem to explain 
various buying decisions made by consumers either in line with the reviews or not 
(Hellwig and Veldkamp 2009). The decision based on one private signal’s precision 
would be unique. With two or more private signals and a cost function of the sum 
of the signal precisions, there will always be multiplicity because a consumer would 
be indifferent between any signal precisions that have the same sum. Therefore, 
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multiple decisions exist. When the true state s and the signals are normally 
distributed, rational inattention prescribes that the amount of information processed 
is M = 
1
2
 ln(| Var(s) | / | Var(s | Ki ) |), which leads to any arbitrary cost function 
c(M).  
 
Rational inattention has the property of diminishing marginal cost of precision: (1) 
Assuming s is a scalar, if signal precision increases by a one-unit, posterior 
precision 1/Var(s | Ki ) increases by one unit. This means that: (1) the marginal cost 
of precision decreases proportionally as Var(s) decreases and explains that why 
learning about something unfamiliar (high Var(s)) is costly; (2) Var(s) falls as a 
consumer learns more about s over time, which means that signal precision could 
get better over time for a given M; and (3) when there are multiple risks resulting 
from a decision, M depends on the determinant of the precision matrix |Var(s | Ki)−1|. 
If risks and signals are independent, M is a product of posterior precisions: Πj (τsj + 
bj− 2). Thus, increasing the precision of signals by acquiring more signals (by 
processing more information) that are already precise (high bj−2) gets cheaper. This 
explains a process of refined, less costly search. The amount of information M is 
approximately the same as the number of binary signals that are necessary to 
transmit information of the given precision (Sims 2003). Once the consumer knows 
by the first binary signal where his/her decision outcomes are, he/she would know 
which quartile the outcomes are in by the second signal, and so forth, because the 
information M is measured in terms of the number of binary signals. If the outcomes 
have a uniform distribution, each additional signal reduces the standard deviation 
by half (increases the precision four-fold). This implies that the interpretation of the 
second review depends on the first review and illustrates how existing reviews help 
consumers interpret new reviews more effectively. The diminishing marginal cost 
of precision can lead to multiple decisions. When the multiplicity of private signals 
is removed from the cost concavity, multiple decisions may arise. 
 
Information Markets and Buying Decisions 
 
Consumers make choices based on the information they have. Most of the time this 
information is incomplete and gathering more information involves frictions such 
as time, effort, and money. Veldkamp (2006) suggested a modeling of information 
frictions with the assumption that consumers can purchase signals from an 
information market (e.g., Angieslist.com). In a typical information market, the 
signal is supplied and sold after being discovered or generated by a producer. It is 
not free because the discovery process is costly. Once discovered, the signal can be 
replicated and sold to others. Because the producer is selling exact copies of the 
same signal, it is a purely public signal (b = 0). Consumers choose a set Ji of signals 
to purchase and observe.  
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If they try to make decisions using the same strategy (in a symmetric equilibrium), 
Var[?̅? | Ki] = 0 and Cov[?̅?, s | Ki] = 0. Only Var[s | Ki] (the true state s) is uncertain. 
However, if a consumer who learns less public information than others has a higher 
Var[?̅? | Ki], he/she would reduce by learning more. If a consumer who learns more 
public information than others, he/she would not change Var[?̅? | Ki] when r > 0 
(Hellwig and Veldkamp 2009). In other words, when decisions are complementary, 
public information is more valuable because the consumer can lower Var[?̅? | Ki] by 
using the information in estimating both the true state and others’ actions. This 
implies that the marginal value of public information is bigger than the marginal 
value of private information. However, observing one additional piece of public 
information, beyond what other consumers have observed, is like observing private 
information. It is in fact public because other consumers can also observe that piece 
of information, but it is effectively private because other consumers have chosen 
not to observe it. If other consumers observe that additional public information, 
then observing the information has a higher marginal value because it reduces 
Var[?̅? | Ki]. Observing that public signal becomes a best strategy. If others choose 
not to observe that additional signal, it is effectively a private signal and has lower 
value. Therefore, the additional signal may not be valuable to observe. 
 
Costly Precision and Buying Decisions 
 
In this section, we consider signals with both public and private noise. First, as in 
Myatt and Wallace (2012), suppose the amount of public (common) noise is 
constant while consumers are allowed to choose private noise. Second, assume the 
amount of private noise is constant while customers are allowed to vary the weight 
their signal places on public noise. According to Myatt and Wallace (2012), a lower 
coefficient bj is interpreted as “paying more attention” and a lower coefficient dj is 
interpreted as “clarifying” signal j. 
 
Such information choices have the following effects. First, more attention to signal 
j (lower bj) reduces the conditional variance of the true state s, Var[s | Ki]. Lowering 
bj has a larger effect on the conditional variance when dj is small (when both public 
noise and private noise are weighted smaller) and lowering dj also has a greater 
effect when bj is small. This means that paying more attention to signal j is valuable 
when the signal is clear and that clearer signals are more valuable if a consumer can 
pay close attention to them. Second, the covariance of this average action with the 
true state s, Cov[?̅?, s | Ki], is proportional to Var[s | Ki]. Third, the conditional 
variance of the average action, Var[?̅? | Ki], depends on how consumers estimate 
others’ signals and on the weight ϒj they place on the jth signal in actions. As a 
consumer pays less and less attention to signal j (when bj gets larger), then signal j 
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gets closer and closer to a private signal. This increases Var[?̅? | Ki] (the degree of 
uncertainty about ?̅?) because the consumer understands less and less of what signals 
other consumers observe. As a consumer pays more and more attention to signal j 
(when bj gets smaller), then signal j gets continually closer to a public signal. This 
reduces Var[?̅? | Ki] (the degree of uncertainty about ?̅?) because the consumer 
understand more and more  of what signals other consumers observe. 
 
Proposition 2: Assume that a consumer's information costs are a function of the 
sum of private precisions (costs increase as private precision increases). Then a 
consumer who has precise private information about the product will make a buying 
decision unconcerned about the reviews. 
 
Now consider the case where, instead of holding d constant and choosing b, b is 
held constant while allowing consumers to choose d. One way to describe this case 
of information choice is that consumers choose from a variety of sites that provide 
the equally good or bad reviews with some common noise, where some sites carry 
a higher signal-to-noise ratio than others. In addition, consumers may introduce 
independent signal-processing noise to whatever they observe, but they cannot 
control this noise. In the previous section, the cost of information of the consumer 
has been defined as c(d, b), which is decreasing in both arguments. This means that 
as the weight on either the common signal noises or idiosyncratic noises increases, 
the consumer's information cost decreases because they would be willing to spend 
more time and effort on information acquisition. 
 
Proposition 3: If c(d) is a convex function and r ∈ [0, 1] (that is, if a consumer's 
information cost decreases as he/she leans more toward other consumers' reviews 
and the reviews are complementary to her buying decision), then there is a unique 
symmetric equilibrium in the choice of signal clarity d (that is, in extreme cases the 
consumer may or may not follow the other consumers' reviews). 
 
One might think that choosing d and choosing the number of reviews to observe 
would cause similar problems. In addition, it is not the presence of private signal 
noise that explains why buying decisions can be different among consumers even 
after they observe the same reviews. Even if B = 0, Proposition 3 still holds because 
consumers could choose different levels of clarity on the same reviews.  
 
As for clarity versus quantity of a review, a consumer can break the signal from the 
review into information that others care about and information they do not (for 
example, brand versus price of a device). The information other consumers observe 
has a different marginal utility for the consumer from the additional information 
they have not observed. That difference creates the idiosyncrasies in utility and, 
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hence, buying decisions. In the signal clarity problem, there is no such breakdown. 
For example, if B = 0, then a consumer who observed two signals with different 
degrees of clarity could infer the public noise p and the true state s accurately. In 
addition, as the level of precision of private signal about the true state s increases, 
it hides more about u and, thus, informs the consumer less about what other 
consumers know and what they will do. In other words, it can raise Var[?̅? | Ki]. A 
consumer who acquires more information from the review would never forgo his/ 
her private signal and, therefore, would maintain a minimum level of ?̅?. 





Understanding the process of consumers' buying decisions is not intuitively obvious 
from the way it appears. Before we come up with any acceptable account of the 
process, we should understand more about consumers' traits as well as the 
characteristics of the goods or services those consumers intend to purchase. 
Consumers' buying decisions would be affected by many factors such as the types 
of product and income elasticity of a product. Buying decisions would also be 
influenced by personal traits, including susceptibility to assertions in product and 
service marketing, budget constraints, sensitivity to the prices of goods or services, 
prior knowledge of the purchase items, and information processing capacity. 
Moreover, buying decisions could be affected by the properties of a consumer 
review, such as depth, length, and the reviewer, per se. Recently, Netflix has 
replaced its five star-based review system with a simple thumbs-up and thumbs-
down because they believe a product gets more ratings when the reviewer has fewer 
decision points (Fowler, 2017). According to Powell et al. (2017), consumers tend 
to purchase a product based on the quantity of reviews, rather than the quality of 
them. 
 
Consumers' buying decision problems can also be formulated with information 
choice. In other words, depending on the way that consumers choose and process 
signals from the reviews, they may or may not make busying decisions in line with 
the reviewers. That is, in economics term multiple equilibria can exist, although in 
general, higher product ratings are associated with higher sales. Nevertheless, the 
presence of multiple equilibria explains why not all consumers follow suit. This 
implies that consumers get different signals from the same reviews that result in 
different purchase decisions. The consumers observe different signals from the 
same reviews and process them in different ways. Of the information choice 
theories, inattentiveness is applicable to describing factual signals, such as expert 
reviews, that can be known objectively and communicated easily. Browsing such 
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reviews might require some time and effort, but they are not likely to be observed 
with noise. Every consumer who observes that particular review knows that other 
consumers have seen the same signal. Rational inattention is a useful way to 
describe more subjective reviews—such as consumer reviews that might include 
seemingly biased viewpoints or narrowly focused opinions—which are often 
influenced by the number of decision points of the reviewer. Reasonable consumers 
might come up with different conclusions on the same reviews. It might require 
consumers to make more cognitive effort to improve their buying decisions. Yet 
another information choice theory, information markets seems to be appropriate to 
explain a situation where the signal may be incorrect (e.g., reviews on subscription-
based review sites and sponsor content on media), but once a consumer see the 
signals, he/she might know what was observed and he/she might also know that 
other consumers observed the same thing. Finally, the costly precision theory 
describes both the idea that the underlying signal may have error and that consumers 
may disagree about how to interpret that signal. The level of disagreement in 
interpreting the signal depends on the weight of the accuracy and clarity of the 
signal a consumer takes into account at the time of signal processing. Considering 
the information choice theories altogether, when consumers want to follow 
decisions that other consumers have already made, they want to know what those 
other consumers know.  
 
However, consumers' buying decisions can be strategic substitutes depending on 
the choice of signals to observe and the precision with which to observe those 
signals. Thus, there are cases of "my way or the highway" buying decisions 
depending on the consumer's information choice. When decisions are 
complementarity, information choice theories can explain why the same reviews 
can result in multiple different buying decisions. A recent study (von Helversen et 
al. 2018) found that information choices could be different across age groups. The 
study found that if making a purchase decision is difficult due to the trade-offs 
between product attributes, younger adults tend to choose the higher-rated product. 
A purchase decision based on higher rate, however, can be changed by a single 
highly influential negative or positive review. On the other hands, older adults's 
purchase decisions are more influenced by a single highly influential negative than 
a powerful positive review. They do not take into account average consumer ratings 
or single powerful positive reviews. The study suggests that consumers in different 
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